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the export boom. The boom, of greater concern to Turkish policymakers, is 
also needed to maintain credit worthiness. In  some ways, Turkish exporters 
have  shown remarkable flexibility in  the face of  adverse market  develop- 
ment.  As  declining oil  revenues choked Middle Eastern  import  demand, 
exporters have successfully reoriented their efforts toward the OECD. But 
export  performance  remains  extremely  sensitive  to  the  domestic  policy 
environment. A  public-investment-led boom  in  domestic demand in  1986 
resulted in  an absolute reduction in export earnings. A renewed program of 
export subsidization since late 1986 appears to have revived exports, as well 
as overinvoicing, but the underlying fragility is still clearly there. 
A fundamental doubt regarding future export performance has to do with 
capacity constraints. The continuation of  the export  drive will  henceforth 
require capital accumulation in export-oriented sectors, as output is reaching 
the limits of existing capacity. But, as discussed in previous chapters, private 
investment has remained soft since the late  1970s, and public investment 
continues to favor infrastructure projects with scant export potential. By  late 
1987, signs of  a genuine structural transformation consistent with  higher 
levels of  trade orientation were still too few for comfort. 
8  The Public Sector: Fiscal 
Adjustment and Resource 
Mobilization 
In  combination with  price,  incomes,  and  external borrowing  policies,  the 
government’s fiscal  policy  has  had  a  close  bearing on  the  conditions of 
macroeconomic stability, trade balance, resource mobilization, and growth in 
the  Turkish economy  in  the  post-1973 period.  Fiscal  policy  has  affected 
macroeconomic performance through the workings of  public sector deficits 
and  their  financing  mechanisms,  and  the  mix  of  public  revenues  and 
spending. 
The 1973-77  period saw a surge in public spending and widening deficits, 
which  were  financed  mainly  through  domestic  credit  expansion.  Under 
reserve decumulation and heavy external borrowing, the expansion of credit 
to the public sector was largely sterilized by  falling net foreign assets of  the 
central bank, producing only a moderate monetary expansion and inflation. 
The unprecedented rise  in  imports also served to dampen the inflationary 
pressures. In  turn, the reduced capital inflows in  1978-79  could no longer 
sterilize deficit  financing through  central bank  credits,  leading to  a  sharp 732  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
acceleration  in  monetary  growth  and  inflation.  Against  the  backdrop  of 
rapidly  worsening  fiscal  performance,  the  post- 1980 adjustment  program 
required  policy  actions  to  lower  public  deficits  and  to  restore  more 
sustainable  fiscal  conditions  as  part  of  an  effort  to  pursue  an  outward- 
oriented approach in the growth process. 
As pointed out in chapters 4 and 5, the fiscal correction  in the post-1980 
era included  revenue  mobilization  in  the  SEE sector,  real  wage cuts  for 
government workers, expenditure restraint, and a tax reform effort. To offset 
the  contractionary  effects of  price  shocks and  falling  private  investment, 
public investment was maintained on a steadily rising path. 
The post-1983 period under the Ozal administration  exhibits a new set of 
trends  in  fiscal  strategy  and  adjustment,  including  fiscal  decentralization, 
introduction  of  the  value-added  tax  system,  and  increased  reliance  on 
domestic  borrowing  (at high  interest  rates)  in  financing  fiscal  deficits.  We 
conclude  that  fiscal  retrenchment  has  not  been  adequate  in  Turkey, 
portending  serious  policy  difficulties  for  the  late  1980s in  coping  with 
inflation,  public  debt, and  deficits  in  an increasingly  competitive political 
context. 
The  present  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  fiscal  adjustment  and 
resource mobilization in Turkey’s public sector in the post- 1980 period.  We 
will  attempt  to  document and  interpret  the  major fiscal  trends  within  the 
framework  of  public  sector  accounts  arranged  on  the  basis  of  national 
income accounting concepts. The chapter ends with an assessment of issues 
in and prospects for fiscal policy. 
8.1  Public Finance: Scope, Size, and Structure 
Turkey  lacks a  unified  system  of  public  sector accounts that  is  strictly 
adhered to in the presentation  of  subsector budgets. The classification  and 
treatment of transactions have not been uniform across government units and 
have showed variation over time. Intrasectoral transfer payments and capital 
flows are not reported  in sufficient detail on a regular basis.  In the present 
Turkish  setting,  the  highly  aggregated  data base of  the SPO serves as  the 
most  consistent  source of  information  on overall public  finance.  The SPO 
data on public finance include figures on public disposable income, savings, 
and investment, from which estimates may  be derived (through  the  use  of 
other relevant data) for public sector borrowing requirements  (PSBRs). 
8.1.1  Institutional Components 
In  the SPO data system, the  Turkish  public  sector  comprises six  major 
components: ( 1) central government, (2) local government, (3) nonfinancial 
SEEs, (4) financial SEEs, (5) revolving fund agencies, and (6) extrabudget- 
ary funds. 733  TurkeyKhapter 8 
Central  government  covers all the usual  public  service departments.  Its 
so-called  consolidated  budget  (including  budgets  of  several  annexed 
agencies)  serves  as  the  central  vehicle  to  mobilize  public  revenue  and 
appropriate  expenditures  under  the  general  scrutiny  and  approval  of  the 
Parliament.  Local  government  comprises municipalities,  special provincial 
administrations,  and  villages,  which  have  had  limited  revenue-generating 
capacity until recently. 
The  nonfinunciul  (or  operational)  SEEs  are  directly  engaged  in  the 
production of  marketable goods and (nonfinancial) services, often requiring 
subsidies  for  their  current  operations  and  budgetary  transfers  for  their 
investment  programs.  The financial  SEEs include state-owned  banks and, 
until recently, social security institutions.  From  1984 on, the social security 
institutions have become revolving fund agencies, which exercise, as adjunct 
governmental entities,  a considerable autonomy  in their financial manage- 
ment. 
In  the post-1983 period,  the Ozal administration  has  introduced  a large 
number  of  extrabudgetary  funds,  presumably  to  increase  flexibility  in 
revenue mobilization  and expenditure allocation. The largest such funds in 
operation before  1983 were the Petroleum Price Stabilization Fund and the 
Support and Price Stabilization Fund (for fertilizer subsidies). As off-budget 
parastatals,  these  funds  face  less  strict  budgetary  control  and  receive 
protection from general budget cuts. 
The  main  financial  sources  of  extrabudgetary  funds  are:  (a)  various 
earmarked  taxes  and  surcharges on foreign trade,  bank  credits,  and  other 
transactions,  (b)  income-sharing  certificates  of  public  utilities  and  enter- 
prises,  (c) interest income on the funds' financial assets, (d) foreign credits, 
and (e) donations and transfers from other funds. Among the new funds, the 
particularly  sizable  ones  are  the  Mass  Housing  Fund  (for  residential 
construction),  the  Public  Participation  Fund  (for  public  infrastructure 
investment),  the  Resource  Utilization  Support  Fund  (for  export  and 
investment incentives), the Development and Support Fund (for animal feed 
stock), the Mutual Assistance and Support Fund (for income transfers to the 
poor),  the  Petroleum  Consumption  Fund  (for  highways  and  municipal 
investments), and the Defense Industry Support Fund. 
The share of public services value added (comprising the gross salaries of 
government employees)  in GNP was 9 percent  in  1980, and declined  to 6 
percent in  1985. In turn, the ratio of the SEE value added to GNP was  11 
percent in 1980, and increased to 17 percent in  1985. The share of SEEs in 
industrial  value  added  was  about  24  and  27 percent  in  1980 and  1985, 
respectively. ' 
In terms of generating  new employment,  the public  sector has played  a 
restrained role in the post-1980 stabilization  period.  In  the mid-l980s, the 
shares  of  public  services  and  SEEs  in  nonagricultural  employment  were 734  Merih Celssun and Dani Rodrik 
nevertheless  sizable, about 20 and 1  1.5 percent, respectively.  As discussed 
in  chapter  5,  the  real  wage  cuts  from  1978 on  have  caused  significant 
changes in the functional and size distribution of income. 
8.1.2  Public Revenue, Disposable Income, and Expenditure 
Table  8.1  shows  public  sector  revenue,  current  transfers,  disposable 
income, and  final expenditure as a percentage  of  GNP (in  current  prices) 
over the 1978-86  period.  The flows in this table exclude capital transfers to 
and from the private sector and abroad, and thus may be viewed  as current 
account  items. It  should  be emphasized that  the  receipts  from off-budget 
funds are not included  in the revenue figures of  the pre-1984 period.'  The 
SPO coverage of  extrabudgetary  funds in  public  revenue is partial in  the 
post-1984 period, but progressively  increases from 1984 onward. 
Current transfers  as  an  item  includes  subsidies,  interest  payments,  tax 
rebates,  and other income transfers to (and from) the private sector and rest 
of  the  world,  making  up  the  difference  between  public  revenue  and 
disposable income. Final expenditure is the sum of public consumption and 
investment,  including  inventory  changes.  In  this  table,  the  revenue- 
expenditure  balance  is  equivalent  to  the  savings-investment  balance  (or 
Table 8.1  Public Sector Current Account, 1978-86  (as  a percentage of  GNP,  current prices) 
1978-79 
Average  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986" 
Public Sector 
I. Revenueb 
2.  Current transfers' 
3.  Disposable income 
(I minus 2) 
a.  Consumption 
b.  Savings 
4.  Final expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4Id 
6. Savings-investment 
balance (3 minus 4) 
Memo items: 
Wealth tax 
Public disposable income 
(1983 prices) of which 



































































































Source: SPO (1985), Central Bank (1987), and various SPO Annual  Programs 
"Provisional estimates. 
bExcludes wealth and capital Rows. 
'Includes  subsidies and interest payments; excludes capital transfers. 
dExcludes capital transfers and debt (principal) repayment. 735  TurkeyKhapter 8 
savings gap) of  the public  sector. Conceptually, wealth taxes (on property 
and motor vehicles) are not considered as an  income flow, but as a capital 
transfer  item.  They  are  thus  excluded  from  public  revenue  figures,  but 
shown as a memo item in table 8.1. 
Leaving the review of fiscal adjustment to section 8.2, we may now point 
to  a number of  basic  trends emerging from the data  shown in  table  8.1. 
Public expenditure (excluding capital transfers) has been consistently around 
26 percent of GNP during the 1978-85  period. Public revenue has remained 
several percentage points below public expenditures in  this period.  Notice 
that there has been a sharp rise in current transfers since 1983. This reflects 
mainly  increased  interest  payments,  which  have  required  a  downward 
adjustment in final expenditures in relation to domestic product. 
The constant-price share of  public disposable income in GNP (shown as 
another memo item in table 8.1) may be compared with the corresponding 
share in current prices to note the strong impact of relative price changes on 
the fiscal position in 1980 and 1981. 
Table  8.2 gives  the  breakdown  of  public  revenue  (by  sources)  and 
disposable  income  (by  institutional components)  for  selected  benchmark 
years  from  1979 to  1986. The data in  the table  show that  the  post-1980 
economic program markedly altered the pattern of  revenue mobilization in 
the public sector. The increased revenue contribution of factor income from 
Table 8.2  Structural Change in Public Revenue and Disposable Income, 1979-86 
I979  1982  1985  I 986a 
A. Public revenue (I) 
I. Taxes 
a.  Direct taxes 
b.  Indirect taxes 
c.  Subtotal 
2.  Nontax budget revenue 
56.6  46.3  25.7  26.3 
38.1  41.4  43.7  32.2 
67.7  63.8  100.3  78.5 
3.5  7. I  9.2  7.5 
- - - - 
- -  _.  - 
27.0  24.8  3. Factor income from propertyb  -3.8  14.4 
4.  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  - - - - 












Revolving fund agencies 
Extrabudgetary funds 
Total 
92.2  81.2  51.0  52.6 
7.7  7.4  12.4  14.7 
-4.1  6.3  26.0  19.4 
3.3  4.2  0.6  0.7 
1 .o  0.9  3.6  3.2 
9.4  -  -  6.4  - 
-  -  - 
l00.od  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  SPO. 
’Provisional estimates. 
bIncluding  net surplus of social security institutions. 
‘The  PDY  figures for subsectors are derived after taxes and intrasectoral transfers. 
dColumn does not add up exactly due to rounding errors. 736  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
property (including SEE profits and depreciation allowances) provided room 
for  tax  reform  initiatives,  which  tended  to  lower  the  tax/GNP  ratio  in 
1980-84.  Only after the introduction of the VAT  (in 1985) and extrabudget- 
ary  funds did  the  relative  share of  indirect  taxes  begin  to shift  upward. 
Correspondingly,  the  structure  of  public  disposable income  shifted  away 
from  the  central  government  in  favor  of  SEEs,  local  government,  and 
extrabudgetary  funds, with  sharp implications  for the  savings  structure  as 
discussed in section 8.4. 
8.1.3  PSBR 
In the absence of  official indicators of the overall PSBR, we have derived 
two  sets  of  estimates  under  two  variant  procedures.  In  variant  A,  the 
PSBR(A) is estimated by adjusting the public savings-investment balance for 
the  following  three  factors:  (  1)  nondebt  capital transfers  (including  wealth 
tax, grants, acquisition or sale of  property, and capital flows connected with 
state  participations);  (2)  valuation  differences  for  the  year-end  SEE 
inventories; and (3) increase  in accounts payable  (or arrears) in the central 
government budget. 
In  variant  B, the  PSBR(B) is estimated  as the total  cash deficit  of  the 
central government and nonfinancial SEEs, excluding the cash needs and/or 
surpluses of other public sector entities. It may be noted that the cash deficit 
of  the  central  government  (included  in  PSBR(B))  is  the  budget  deficit 
adjusted for arrears. 
Table 8.3 shows the estimates PSBR(A) and PSBR(B) for the  1980-86 
period.  Despite differences  for particular years, the trends displayed  by the 
two series are not too dissimilar. The estimation of PSBR(A) is conceptually 
more  satisfactory,  even though  the quality  of  underlying  data on nondebt 
capital  transfers  is  somewhat que~tionable.~  This qualification  as regards 
data  notwithstanding,  the  PSBR(A)  estimates  appear  to be  closer  to  the 
actual cash deficits of the overall public sector in the post-1980  adjustment 
period, and for this reason we have chosen to rely on this version here and in 
other chapters. Table 8.3 also gives the financing items for PSBR(A), which 
point to  the tendency  toward  reduced  central  bank financing and increased 
domestic borrowing, especially after 1983. The particular fiscal characteris- 
tics of the intervening years in  1980-86  are reviewed  in the next section. 
8.2  Fiscal Adjustment, 1980-86 
8.2.1  Overall Fiscal Policy 
In main, four sets of  factors  have  shaped  the overall  fiscal policy  in the 
1980-86  period.  First,  public  sector  deficits  prior  to  1980  required 
immediate corrective actions, both in the budget and SEEs, to regain control 
over  monetary  growth  and  inflation.  Second,  the  policymakers  attached 737  TurkeyKhapter 8 
Table 8.3  PSBR Estimates, 1980-86  (as a percentage of GNP) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986' 
1.  Variant A: PSBR(A) 
Financing (net) 
External borrowing 
Domestic borrowing  (Treasury) 
Budget, long term 
Budget, short term 
Central bank 
Other 
2.  Variant  B: PSBR(B) 
Cash deficit 
a. Central government budget 
b. SEEsb 
c. Total (a + b)  = PSBR(B) 
Memo items: 
Interest rate on government 
























5.0  5.3 
1.0  1.4 
1.5  0.9 
0.6  1.8 
0.8  -0.9 
0.3  0.6 
2.2  2.3 
2.1  2.1 
3.9  2.9 
6.0  5.0 
45 





































Source: Variant  A: Estimates based on SPO data, see tables A.7 and A.8 in statistical appendix. Variant B: 
OECD (1986) for  1980-84  and Central Bank (1987) for 1985-86  estimates. 
"Provisional estimates 
bCash deficit of nonfinancial SEEs after budgetary and parabudgetary transfers, and before arrears and State 
Investment Bank Credits. 
importance to output recovery  and growth  objectives, and chose to reduce 
the public savings gap through increased savings rather than through a major 
reduction  in public  investment, especially  in  the context of  falling  private 
fixed  investment.  Third,  the  tax  system  needed  qualitative  changes  and 
restructuring to halt bracket creep (or fiscal drag) in income taxation, reduce 
evasion, and revitalize  indirect  tax  revenues,  which  had  fallen  rapidly  in 
proportion  to  GNP in  the  latter  part  of  the  1970s.  Moreover,  financial 
liberalization  and various  supply-side  concerns required  adjustments  in tax 
burdens  and incentives.  Hence,  a  complex  tax  reform package had  to be 
introduced  with  rather  uncertain  prospects  for  the  tax/GNP  ratio  in  the 
medium run. Fourth, a fiscal decentralization  away from central government 
was  perceived  to  be  essential  by  the  authorities  to  increase  allocational 
flexibility in general and improve local government finances in particular. 
Thus, the  overall fiscal  policy  evolved under a  number of  cyclical  and 
structural  constraints  in  such  a  manner  as  to  support  the  stabilization, 
recovery,  and liberalization objectives in the post- 1980 adjustment program. 
For  adjustment  mechanisms,  the  fiscal  policy  relied  mainly  on  flexible 
pricing  in  the  SEEs,  real  wage  reductions,  tax  restructuring,  and  lately 
domestic  borrowing  in  an  effort  to  sustain  an  acceptable  growth  of 
developmental  expenditures  in  the  economy.  The  multiplicity  of  policy 738  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
objectives and instruments produced  conflicts,  however,  in the implementa- 
tion process. The fiscal adjustment in the intervening years is reviewed in the 
rest of this ~ection.~ 
8.2.2  1980-82 
This subperiod saw a determined price-stabilization  effort, which resulted 
in a sizable fiscal retrenchment.  The PSBR was nearly halved in this policy 
phase,  mainly  due to the  rise  in  public  revenue,  disposable income,  and 
savings. The external debt relief  was helpful in avoiding a rapid increase in 
current  transfers  (including  interest  payments),  and  therefore  indirectly 
contributed to the attainment of deficit  reduction.  Central bank financing of 
the PSBR declined sharply from 3.5 percent of GNP in  1980 to 0.3  percent 
in  1982. 
Revenue mobilization  was  boosted  in  1980-82  primarily  by  the rise  in 
SEE factor  incomes. With  the  maintenance  of  government employment at 
reduced  real  wages,  public  consumption continued to grow in  real  terms, 
providing social services to the economy at sharply lowered relative prices. 
The  tax  reform  initiated  in  late  1980  showed  positive  results  in  1981, 
yielding an increase  in tax elasticity  (i.e.,  the proportional response of  tax 
revenues to increases in income) from 0.9 to 1.2 in that year. However, the 
tax elasticity dropped to 0.8 in  1982 because of  altered income brackets and 
lowered tax rates. 
8.2.3  1983 
The public savings gap widened in 1983 because of the decline in the ratio 
of  public disposable  income to GNP,  which  was in turn due to the sizable 
increase in external interest payments of the central government budget. That 
year saw a legislative initiative to simplify the settlement of tax arrears and 
to assess taxable  income in relation  to observed expenditures. The further 
fall  in  tax/GNP  ratio  could  not  be  adequately  offset  by  SEE  revenue 
increases.  The PSBWGNP ratio  could be  held  around 5 percent  in  1983, 
mainly through a large increase in the arrears of the central government. 
8.2.4  1984 
After the general  elections of  November  1983, the  Ozal administration 
could  not  reverse  in  1984 the  deteriorating  revenue performance and  the 
rising current transfers of  the public  sector. Foreign interest  payments  were 
grossly underestimated in the central government budget, but had to be fully 
serviced.  The increase  in the nominal value of  SEE inventories  (including 
agricultural  support purchases)  was  unexpectedly  large. In terms of  public 
finance  shares  in  GNP,  the  burden  of  adjustment  was  mainly  on  final 
expenditure  categories. A  restraint  on nontransfer expenditures could  not, 
however, halt the widening of the overall cash deficit, which increased above 
7 percent  of  GNP,  requiring  an expansion in central  bank  financing and a 
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In the first half of  1984, the public sector financing pressures on money 
supply were augmented by pressures from the balance of payments as export 
earnings were stimulated by  trade liberalization and new incentives. Despite 
the large rise in interest rates, the liquidity expansion could not be contained, 
and the inflation rate surged to 52 percent (as measured by  the WPI) in 1984 
from 31 percent in  1983. The reduction in real demand for money base after 
the introduction of  foreign exchange deposits might also have contributed to 
excess money supply in  1984. In order to attract private financial savings, 
the interest rate on Treasury borrowing was raised to nearly 60 percent with 
vast consequences for the interest burden on the central government budget. 
8.2.5  1985-86 
The worsening fiscal trends were partially reversed in  1985. Despite the 
continuing rise in current transfers, the shares of public disposal income and 
savings in GNP could be raised that year mainly through a rapid recovery in 
public revenue. The sources of revenue expansion were SEE factor incomes, 
the VAT,  nontax revenues, and various levy collections for the extrabudget- 
ary funds. 
The reversed fiscal trends more or less continued in 1986. The PSBWGNP 
ratio was lowered from above 7 percent in  1984 to less than 5 percent in 
1985-86,  together with the reduction in  the inflation rate to 27 percent in 
1986 from 52 percent in  1984. In  the context of  falling dollar prices of oil 
and nonoil imports in  1986, a larger reduction in inflation could have been 
attained through  a moderate rise  in  public  expenditures and  smaller cash 
deficits. 
8.3  Public Debt 
As argued in chapters 4 and 5, the post-1980 Turkish economic recovery 
benefited  from  the  external  debt  relief  extended  in  1980-84.  With  the 
termination  of  debt  relief  in  1984, Turkey began  to  face  an  increase  in 
external  debt  service,  which  may  extend,  if  the  debt  is  not  partly 
rescheduled, over the 1985-90  period. This debt overhang gives rise to two 
familiar problems: the need for noninterest surpluses in the current account 
of  the balance of  payments,  and additional domestic resource mobilization 
by  the public sector for debt servicing. 
As  in  other  heavily  indebted  middle-income  countries,  the  bulk  of 
Turkey’s external debt is held by  the public sector. The rise in external debt 
service raises current transfers (through larger than usual interest payments), 
lowers public disposable income, and puts pressure on the budget balance. 
Furthermore, the repayment of  principal reduces the volume of  net foreign 
borrowing  as  a  financing item  for the  PSBR,  requiring the  expansion of 
either central bank financing and/or domestic borrowing through the issue of 
government securities. Also, as part of  the policy actions taken to increase 740  Merih Celisun and Dani Rodrik 
international  competitiveness  and  generate  noninterest  current  account 
surpluses, the exchange rate depreciation tends to increase the relative size 
of debt service in relation to budget revenue and expenditures. 
In Turkey in  1984-86,  policymakers faced all these problems and chose 
to  use  domestic  borrowing  as  the  main  mechanism  to  cope  with  the 
remaining  fiscal  disequilibrium.  However,  a  heavy  reliance  on  domestic 
borrowing accelerated the rise in public debt from 1984 on, creating a larger 
debt claim on limited public sector resources. 
Table 8.4 shows the principal indicators of  the Turkish public debt from 
1981 to  1986. In the presentation of  figures for debt stock in part A of  this 
table,  following the official practice, the public sector includes the SEES, 
while excluding the central bank. As a proportion of  GNP, the public debt 
was  about 35  percent  in  1981-82,  nearly 45 percent  in  1983-84,  and 49 
percent  in  1985-86.6  From  1983 on,  the  ratio  of  public  debt  to  public 
revenue has fluctuated around 200 percent. 
Within the public sector, the central government budget carries the major 
burden  of  servicing public  external debt.  With  an  increasing recourse to 
Table 8.4  Indicators of  Public Debt, 1981-86 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986a 
A.  Public debt stock 
1.  Public external debt 
a.  billion $ 
b.  trillion TL 
a. Consolidated debtb 
b.  Nonconsolidated debt 
c.  Subtotal 
3. Total public debt (lb + 2c) 
a.  trillion TL 
b.  %GNP 
c.  % public revenue 
2.  Public domestic debt (trillion TL) 
B.  Debt service in central government budget 
(% GNP)' 
1.  External 
2.  Domestic 
3.  Total 
Memo items: 
Central government budget 
Revenue (% GNP) 






























































































Source:  Central bank of Turkey, SPO, and OECD (1986) 
"Provisional estimates. 
%e  bulk  of  consolidated debt covers devaluation-induced valuation changes in  external debt held by  the 
central bank. 
'Including principal and interest payments 741  TurkeyXhapter 8 
Treasury borrowing in financing the cash deficits, the domestic debt service 
burden also rose sharply in the post-1984 period as shown in part B of table 
8.4. The ratio  of  total  debt  service  to  revenue  in  the  central  government 
budget increased  from about 15 percent in  1981-83  to nearly 40 percent in 
1985-86.  The  latter  has  required  a  tight  stance  on  social  outlays  and 
personnel expenditures, lowering the general quality of  social services (e.g., 
health and education) in Turkey. 
In  the review  of  public  debt, it  should  also be  noted  that  the  so-called 
consolidated  debt  (of  the  central  government)  constitutes  a  significant 
portion  of  domestic  public  debt.  Besides  including  obligations  previously 
contracted, this debt stock primarily covers devaluation-induced  differences 
in the Turkish lira value of external debt held by the central bank, which are 
treated as Treasury liabilities in the monetary authorities’ accounting system. 
The nominal interest rates on consolidated debt are very low, and therefore 
average  interest  rates  on total  domestic  debt have  been  much  lower than 
interest rates on the newly issued government securities. 
From  1984 on, the  domestic  borrowing  for  PSBR  financing  has  relied 
basically  on two financial instruments: short-term  Treasury bills and longer 
term government bonds,  with small nominal differences  in their respective 
interest  rates (see memo items in table 8.3). Since May  1985, the  interest 
rates  of  these  securities  have  been  determined  through  weekly  auctions. 
These default-free,  tax-exempt,  and  high-yield  money-market  instruments 
have become quite popular for commercial banks, which are allowed to hold 
them against their liquidity  requirement^.^ 
Table 8.5 provides data on security issues in Turkey during 1982-86,  with 
the  volumes  issued  by  the  public  and  private  sectors  expressed  as 
percentages of GNP. The indicators in the table crystallize the predominance 
of  the public sector in the issue of securities in the Turkish financial system 
after 1983. While contributing to the promotion of financial intermediation, 
the disproportionately high share of the public sector in new security issues 
Table 8.5  Securities Issued, 1982-86  (as a percentage of GNP) 
~~ 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
I. Public sector 
a. Government bonds (long term)  0.9  2.2  2.0  4.3  3.2 
b.  Treasury bills (short term)  -  -  6.9  5.1  4.5 
-  -  0.5  0.6  c. Income-sharing certificates  - 
d. Total  0.9  2.2  8.9  9.9  8.3 
a. Bonds  0.2  0.1  0.  I  0.1  0.3 
b. Equities  I .2  0.8  0.6  0.3  0.3 
c. Total  1.4  0.9  0.7  0.4  0.6 
2. Private sector 
~_____ 
Source  Central Bank (1987) 
Note  Em-dashes indicate that percentages were negligible or zero 742  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
has tended to crowd out suitable domestic financing for private  investment, 
especially in the manufacturing sector, as further discussed at the end of the 
following section. 
8.4  Role of the Public Sector in Savings and Investment 
8.4.1  Basic Trends 
A review  of Turkey’s public  finances also requires a broad discussion of 
the  share  and  role  of  the  public  sector  in  economywide  savings  and 
investment.  The public  sector influences  capital formation  directly through 
its  own  savings effort and  investment programs.  It affects  private  savings 
and  investment behavior  indirectly  through  demand  management,  external 
borrowing, and structural policies.  Keeping in mind the longer term growth 
requirements  of  the  Turkish  economy,  policymakers  have  placed  a  high 
premium  on public investment in the  1980s (with  some restructuring of its 
contents) at the cost of a continued fiscal imbalance. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the  changes in  investment rates (as percentages  of 
GNP in current prices) from 1978 through  1986. The investments portrayed 
in this figure cover inventory  changes (excluding valuation adjustments for 
year-end inventory stocks). Besides pointing to the relatively larger share of 
the  public  sector in  total  investment,  figure  8.1 also brings  out the  active 
demand management role of the public sector in offsetting the large slack in 
private investment  in the wake of the post- 1980 adjustment program. 
In turn, the changes in the composition of economywide savings over the 
same  period  are  illustrated  in  figure  8.2.  The  time  paths  for  various 
categories  of  savings  (also  measured  as  percentages  of  GNP  in  current 
prices) bring  out  four  major  points.  First,  the  public  sector  saving  effort 
rapidly  improved  under  the  post-1980  adjustment  program,  with  some 
slippage in  1983-84.  Second, notwithstanding the interest rate reform, the 
private savings/GNP ratio declined in 1980-83.  Third, foreign savings were 
sizable  in  1980-81,  lending  support  to  domestic  measures  aiming  at 
macroeconomic  stabilization.  Fourth,  from  1984 on,  the  share  of  private 
savings in GNP began to show some recovery from the lowest point reached 
in  1983. 
To  crystallize the  savings-investment patterns  further,  table  8.6 gives (in 
part  A) figures  for the  relevant  ratios  (to GNP), and provides  (in part  B) 
disaggregated  data  for the public  sector.  In  effect, this  table  complements 
table 8.4, which presented  an institutional breakdown  of  public  disposable 
income for the same benchmark years between  1979 and 1986. While part A 
in  table 8.6 quantifies  the improvement  in public  savings from 1979 on, it 
also invites attention  to the sharp rise  in private savings and investment in 
1986. 
In part B of table 8.6, the breakdown of public savings and investment by 
institutional components over time clearly shows the decentralization trends 743  TurkeyXhapter 8 
30 
25 






I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
- 
IP + IG  G 
15- 
/. 
/  *------/  IP  /-.  0.  \,-- 
---d  - 
5- 
I  I  I  1  I  I  I  I  I 
in  the  public  sector.  The  share  of  central  government  in  public  savings 
sharply fell to about 17 percent in 1985-86  from more than  100 percent in 
1979. Under flexible pricing  policies, the  SEES managed to increase their 
capacity for resource mobilization quite significantly,  albeit at the  cost of 
preventing deeper inroads into price stabilization. The investment programs 
of  local government and extrabudgetary funds also became the beneficiaries 
of the reduced role of central government in the overall public finance. 
8.4.2  Domestic Saving Behavior 
Table  8.7 lists  the  major  indicators of  domestic savings  from  1978 to 
1986, which are based on current price data.8 As these indicators show, the 
private saving performance was sluggish in  1980-85  despite the switch to 
positive real interest rates (on time deposits), which played a crucial role in 
monetary adjustment as discussed in chapters 4 and  5. In turn, the saving 
drive of the public sector contributed more effectively to the adjustments in 744  Merih CelIsun and Dani Rodrik 
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Fig. 8.2  Savings (% GNP, in current prices) 
Note: SP is private savings; SG is public savings; and F is foreign savings 
the real side of the economy. The share of public sector in domestic savings 
increased to 50 percent in  1985 from 25 percent in 1978-79.  How can we 
then explain the disappointing saving performance in the private sector in the 
earlier part of the 1980s, especially in the aftermath of a major reform of the 
interest rate policy?' 
The relevant  income base  for private savings (and consumption) is not 
national income, but private disposable income, which dropped 5 percent in 
real terms in  1980 after stagnating in 1978-79.  It also failed to increase in 
1981. In  per  capita terms,  the  cumulative real  fall  in  private  disposable 
income was about 10 percent from 1978 to 1981. At the aggregate level, one 
possible hypothesis is that private agents strived to protect their consumption 
levels by  lowering their short-run propensities to save. 
The  interpretation  of  private  saving  behavior  in  the  early  1980s  is 
confounded by  another factor, namely the observed distributional change in 
favor of  nonagricultural capital income, which is expected to have a priori a 
higher savings ratio.  The distributional analysis summarized at the end of Table 8.6  Structural Change in Savings and Investment, 1979-86 
1979  1982  1985  I986* 
Savings Investment  Savings lnvestment  Savings Investment  Savings Investment 
A. Sector totals (% GNP, current prices) 
1. Public 
2.  Private 
3.  Rest of  the world 
4. Total 


































































8.9  11.0 
12.1  12.2 
9.2  11.0 
9.2  9.5 
1.2  N.A.  2.2  N.A.  ---- 
20.5  20.5  23.2  23.2 
16.1  32.3  18.7  35.0 
14.2  9.6  17.1  15.4 
49.6  50.8  38.1  37.9 
1.2  0.4  1.3  0.3 
6.8  1.4  6.2  2.3 
12.2  5.5  18.6  9.1 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
__-__- 
~  ~_______ 
Source:  SPO 
Note:  N.A. means not applicable. 
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Table 8.7  Savings Ratios, 1979-86* (in percentages) 
1978-79 
Average  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986b 
1.  Ratios 
a.  Private savings to  private 
disposable income  14.6  12.9  11.6  11.5  11.2  11.0  11.4  14.6 
b. Public savings to public 
disposable income  21 .0  29.8  43.4  45.2  42.1  46.3  52.3  50.9 
c. Domestic savings to GNP  16.0  15.9  18.0  18.1  16.5  16.8  18.6  21.0 
d. Foreign savings to GNP  2.4  5.5  3.5  2.2  4.1  2.8  1.9  2.2 
e. Total savings to GNP  18.4  21.4  21.5  20.3  20.6  19.6  20.5  23.2 
2.  Composition of 
domestic savings 
a. Private  75.0  66.7  52.2  50.8  55.8  54.8  50.5  57.6 
b.  Public 
C.  Totdl 
25.0  33.3  47.8  49.2  44.2  45.2  49.5  42.4 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
- - - - - - - - 
Memo items: 
Growth of  private 
Growth of  private 
Real interest rate 
disposable  income  0.9  -5.1  0.3  4.3  5.1  7.6  3.4  9.8 
fixed investment  -8.9  -17.3  -8.7  5.5  4.8  1.8  13.3  13.5 
(I-yr deposits, after tax)  -27.1  -37.6  0.2  8.2  4.9  4.0  7.9  15.9 
Source:  SPO (1985) for 1978-83,  and Central Bank (1987) for 1984-86  data. 
"Parts  1 and 2 are based on current price data. 
bProvisional estimates. 
chapter 5 points  to the large income gains of the wholesale and retail trade 
sector from  relative  price  changes  observed  in  the  post-1978  period.  The 
saving propensity  of  income recipients in the trade sector might have been 
somewhat  lower  than  the  saving  rates  in  other  productive  sectors, which 
contributed more substantially to savings in the earlier periods. 
A  further observation  in  this  context  relates  to  the  composition  of  the 
private savings aggregate defined in the official national  accounts,  which we 
have used. Besides covering household savings, this aggregate also includes 
depreciation allowances and undistributed enterprise profits,  which declined 
in  some  manufacturing  firms  confronted  with  illiquidity  problems  in  the 
early 1980s. Moreover, the private savings aggregate in the national accounts 
is not voluntary savings in the pure sense, as it implicitly includes the forced 
transfers (to the  public  sector) effected via new money creation.  The con- 
traction of real money base from 1979 on (recall fig. 4.1) definitely played 
a role  in  lowering  the  seignorage  portion of  private  savings  in  the  early 
1980s. 
Finally,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  nature  of  adjustment  mechanisms  (or 
closure rules) for the savings-investment balance also affects the determina- 
tion of private  savings in a general equilibrium context."  In the face of  low 
capacity utilization  rates, reduced aggregate demand, and high user cost of 747  TurkeyEhapter 8 
capital,  investors’  enthusiasm was definitely  at  a low  level prior  to  1985, 
possibly dampening real demand for private savings. The actual outturn for 
1985-86  suggests that  private  savings  adjusted  quite rapidly  to the rising 
investment  demand  in  the  private  sector  in  the  wake  of  generous  new 
incentives provided by the extrabudgetary  funds, especially for mass housing 
projects. 
In concluding  our brief  discussion  on saving behavior,  we would  like to 
draw attention to the fact that domestic saving rates in Turkey have not been 
high by cross-country standards, as was shown in table 1.2. In relation to the 
size of its disposable  income base, the public sector’s direct contribution  to 
resource  mobilization  for  investment  has  been  substantial  in  the  1980s, 
requiring  a prolonged  tight  stance on public  consumption. In  turn, private 
saving rates have been rather low, despite the policymakers’  preference for a 
market-directed  growth  process  in  the  future.  The  present  discussion 
suggests that private saving may respond favorably to new incentives under 
more  viable  and  stable  macroeconomic  conditions  for  investment  and 
growth. 
8.4.3  Investment Allocation 
To  complement  the  analysis  of  saving  and  investment  patterns  at  the 
macrolevel,  table  8.8 provides  sectoral  data  on  the  distribution  of  fixed 
investment for the periods  1973-78,  1979-83,  and 1986. The sector-level 
data on investment allocation reveal four notable trends. 
First, the share of manufacturing in total investment exhibits a continuing 
decline from 1978 on. Bearing in mind the heavy reliance on manufactured 
goods in the Turkish export drive, this trend gives rise to the question of the 
sustainability  of  export  growth  in  the  early  1980s. Second, the  share of 
Table 8.8  Fixed Investment by Major Activity Sectors, 1913-86 
(as a percentage of total) 
1986b 
1973-78  Total”  1979-83  Totala  Private  Public  Total 
Agriculture 































8.0  7.4 
28.5  16.9 
8.3  18.2 
33.2  26.2 
1.1  1.6 
1.8  16.5 
5.6  3.6 
13.5  9.6 
Source:  SPO. 
“In constant 1983 prices. 
bProvisional estimates reported in Central Bank (1987). 748  Merih CelAsun and Dani Rodrik 
agriculture in total investment has been steadily low, despite the predominant 
position  of  this  sector in  total  employment. From  1978 on, the  depressed 
levels of  investment in this  sector may be attributed to the fall  in farmers’ 
real  incomes  and  generally  weakened  external  demand  conditions  for 
agricultural products in the mid-1980s. Third, the rising share of energy and 
mining  (mainly hydroelectric  power and coal) is a positive element  in the 
pursuit  of  reduced  dependence  on energy  imports in  the  growth  process. 
Fourth, transportation and housing investments have definitely been boosted 
from 1983 on, following relatively low levels of investment activity in these 
sectors in  1978-83.  The 1986 data also point to an encouraging revival in 
tourism investments. 
To  arrive at sound judgments on investment allocation, a wider analysis is 
needed of Turkey’s comparative advantage,  factor proportions, and sectoral 
interdependence  in the  longer term  growth process.  The investment trends 
emerging from data shown in table 8.8 broadly suggest that an allocational 
shift is needed from services to manufacturing to avoid capacity bottlenecks 
in outward-oriented growth in the medium-term future. 
In the context of investment allocation,  a critical problem is the efficient 
deployment  of  various  categories  of  private  savings  to  high-priority 
investment programs.  In the past,  Turkey’s financial markets have played a 
highly limited role in coping with this problem.  In the late  1980s, vigorous 
recovery  of  manufacturing  investment  requires,  besides  the  sector’s  own 
resources, additional savings from the financial system at moderate costs. As 
the data presented earlier in table 8.5 show, the share of private  bonds and 
equities in total security issues was less than  10 percent  during  1984-86,  a 
period  which  saw an unprecedented  rise in the Treasury  borrowing  at high 
real rates of  interest. Hence, the size and pattern of private investments will 
be closely affected by the fiscal adjustment in the public sector. 
8.5  Fiscal Policy: Achievements, Issues, and Prospects 
We have attempted in the present chapter to broadly document and review 
the  patterns  of  fiscal  adjustment  and  public  resource  mobilization  in  the 
1980-86  period.  The  examination  of  fiscal  trends  suggests  that  SEES, 
extrabudgetary funds, and local government should be integrated into public 
accounts for a wider  assessment of fiscal policy links with macroeconomic 
performance. 
For  revenue  mobilization,  fiscal  policy  has  relied  heavily  on  SEE price 
adjustments.  SEE prices were clearly out of line before  1980 and required 
immediate and  large corrections  at the outset. However,  in  the  absence of 
deeper  rationalization  of  the  SEE  system,  a  continuing  and  excessive 
reliance on SEE price hikes-in  conjunction  with  markup pricing practices 
in  the  private  industrial  sector-has  produced  conflicts  in  the  price 
stabilization process and contributed to the volatility of inflation rates. 749  TurkeyKhapter 8 
Turkey’s  tax  reform  effort  resulted  in  tax  revenue  losses  toward  the 
mid-1980s  (after  a  short-lived  tax  rise  in  1981) and  contributed  to  the 
weakening  of  fiscal  retrenchment.  Again,  the  initial  conditions  were 
important in the choice of  policy direction. The tax reform focused on tax 
restructuring to overcome bracket creep in income taxation, reduce the tax 
burden  on  financial intermediation,  and  broaden  the base  for indirect tax 
revenue. The illiquidity problems of part of the private sector also required a 
relief in corporate taxes. 
The tax reform initiatives began to pay off after the introduction of  the 
VAT  system (in 1985) and the switch to tariff protection in the trade regime. 
Despite their unduly complicated nature, the taxes,  surcharges, and nontax 
revenues collected by  local government and new  extrabudgetary funds also 
contributed to the rebound  in public revenue in  1985-86.  The Turkish tax 
reform  experience shows  that  tax  restructuring is  a  lengthy  process  and 
should not be  exclusively relied  upon  as a  vehicle for additional revenue 
mobilization in the early phases of adjustment programs. In this connection, 
the important lesson is that  the tax  system requires continual modernizing 
improvements in a rapidly changing economic structure. In  the future,  the 
Turkish tax system should have a broader base to encompass taxable incomes 
in the services sector. 
A  rapid  output  recovery  after  the  1978-80  episode  required  the 
maintenance of real growth of public investment with some alterations in its 
allocational  pattern.  Because  of  rising  current  transfers,  the  brunt  of 
adjustment  in  the  disposition  of  available  net  income  fell  on  public 
consumption, mainly through real reductions in the salaries of  government 
employees.  The  latter  mechanism  seems  to  have  produced  a  general 
worsening in the quality of  social services. 
Turkey  faces  a  substantial increase  in  its  external  debt  service  in  the 
1985-90  period.  In  1985-86  the  burden  of  external  interest  payments 
prevented  a  notable recovery  in  public  disposable  income  (in  relation  to 
GNP) despite a marked rise in public revenue. With the reluctance to restrain 
public  investment, the  overall fiscal deficit  (PSBR) could  not  be  lowered 
adequately after reaching a peak in  1984. In the face of reduced net foreign 
borrowing, policymakers chose to rely on domestic borrowing at high real 
rates  of  interest,  which  crowded out  investment  financing  in  the  private 
sector,  especially  in  manufacturing,  whose  dependence  on  the  financial 
system has increased in the post-1980 era. 
From 1984 on, the heavy reliance on Treasury bond issues in coping with 
fiscal disequilibrium has given rise to a complex set of  policy issues. The 
bond-financing of  deficits adds a rising domestic debt burden to the public 
sector’s external debt service.  At  the macro level,  the internal adjustment 
shaped by  fiscal policy  becomes compatible with  the balance-of-payments 
constraint at the  cost of  very  high  real rates of  interest, to which  private 
savings did not sharply respond in the 1980-85  period. On the other hand, 750  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
high interest rates aggravate the illiquidity problems and tend to discourage a 
vigorous  investment  recovery  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  which  provides 
the  major  productive  base,  besides  tourism  and  some services, to sustain 
export expansion. Favorable  supply conditions  for export and GNP growth 
are essential  to sustain  the trade-liberalization  process  and to maintain  an 
adequate capacity to service external debt. 
As  we  argued  in  section  8.4, macroeconomic  stability  is  particularly 
important  for  a  harmonized  savings-investment  balance  in  the  Turkish 
economy. The large fiscal deficits pose a threat to macroeconomic stability 
and  growth  because  their  monetization  remains a  tempting  policy  option, 
given  the  historical  precedents  in  the  Turkish  context.  With  limited 
possibilities  to reduce public  consumption further, a  noninflationary  fiscal 
adjustment  will  have  to be  based  on a  socially  acceptable  mix  of  public 
revenue  increase  and  restrained  public  investment  for a  brief  transitional 
period.  This  process  may  require  complementary  actions  for  a  partial 
refinancing and/or rescheduling of the public sector’s external debt in such a 
way  as to avoid a deterioration  in Turkey’s hard-earned  creditworthiness in 
the international financial markets. 
Finally,  toward  the  end  of  the  1980s,  Turkey’s  public  finance  system 
requires  further qualitative  changes and  improvements aiming  at noninfla- 
tionary  methods  of  revenue  mobilization,  deeper  SEE  rationalization 
(including  gradual  privatization),  and streamlining  of  extrabudgetary  funds 
and  local  government  finances.  While  seeking  a  greater  macrolevel 
flexibility  in  fiscal  policy,  efforts  may  also  be  usefully  directed  to  the 
redesign  of  budgetary  methods  for  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  public 
resources. 
9  External Financial Relations and 
Debt Management 
Since the  early  1970s, Turkey’s  relations  with  the  international  financial 
community  have  been  consistently  out of  synch with  those of  most  other 
highly  indebted countries. Turkey entered its debt crisis in  1977, at a time 
when a general crisis was still far off in the horizon. Its recovery and export 
boom in  198 1 coincided  with increasing  difficulties experienced by debtors 
in Latin America and elsewhere. In  1982, just as the rest of the developing 
world  became engulfed  in  a debt  crisis  and  new  flows  from  commercial 
banks dried up, Turkey reentered private international capital markets.  Since 